Building the Guardrails™: When Business as Usual Isn’t an Option
Most financial firms have a business continuity plan, and many review or test them annually. But having a plan and being prepared are not the same thing. A business continuity plan can satisfy a policy requirement while still failing when it is needed. The difference usually comes down to whether the plan reflects the way the business operates today—not the way it operated when the document was first written. That distinction matters because financial services firms have become increasingly dependent on interconnected technology, third-party service providers, cloud applications, remote employees, electronic communications, and centralized data. A disruption in any one of those areas can quickly become a business continuity event.
The guardrail is not the document. The guardrail is the firm’s ability to continue serving clients, protect information, communicate internally and externally, and restore critical operations when normal business processes are unavailable.
Business Continuity Has Changed
Historically, business continuity planning often focused on physical disasters. What happens if the office floods? What happens if a hurricane or tornado makes the building inaccessible? Where will employees work if the office cannot be used? Those questions still matter. But today, many firms could lose access to their physical office and continue operating with relatively little interruption. Employees may work remotely, records may be stored in the cloud, telephone service may be redirected, and meetings can move online. That flexibility has solved some traditional continuity problems, but it has also created new dependencies. What happens if Microsoft 365 is unavailable? What happens if the firm’s custodian experiences an outage? What happens if a cyberattack disables systems rather than a tornado disabling the office? Modern business continuity planning must account for the fact that firms may be physically distributed but technologically concentrated. Moving operations to the cloud does not eliminate the risk, it changed where the risk resides.
Start With Critical Functions, Not Disasters
One of the most useful ways to evaluate a continuity plan is to stop thinking first about disasters and instead identify the functions the firm cannot afford to lose. For an advisory or broker-dealer organization, those functions may include serving clients, executing transactions, moving money, communicating with clients and vendors, accessing required information, and managing the firm. Once those functions are identified, the next question becomes more useful: What does each function depend on?
A trading process may depend on an employee, a portfolio management platform, internet access, a custodian connection, multifactor authentication, and a functioning communication channel. Client service may depend on a CRM system, email, telephone service, document storage, and access to account information. Compliance supervision may depend on electronic communications systems, transaction reports, exception reports, branch personnel, and third-party surveillance tools.
Mapping those dependencies shows management what actually has to work for the business to function and often reveals vulnerabilities that a traditional BCP document does not. Instead of trying to predict every possible disaster, the firm identifies what must continue regardless of the cause of the disruption.
The Single-Point-of-Failure Test
Every firm should periodically ask whether any critical process depends too heavily on one person, one system, or one vendor. Perhaps only one employee knows how to process a certain type of transaction. Maybe only one person has administrative access to a critical system. Emergency contact information may exist only inside the CRM system. A backup communication method may depend on the same technology environment as the firm’s primary communication channel. Individually, none of these issues sounds especially dramatic during normal operations. During a disruption, each can become a serious problem very quickly. A useful continuity exercise therefore asks: If this person, system, location, or vendor became unavailable today, what would we do next? If the answer depends on someone “figuring it out,” the process probably needs another guardrail. Someone should own the alternative process, understand when it should be activated, and have the authority necessary to act.
Disaster Recovery Is Only Part of Business Continuity
Business continuity and disaster recovery are often discussed together, but they are not the same thing. Disaster recovery generally focuses on restoring systems and data; business continuity focuses on how the organization functions while that recovery is underway. A technology provider may tell the firm that systems can be restored within several hours. That does not answer how employees will communicate during those hours, how the firm will determine whether urgent client transactions are pending, or how management will know which systems are affected. It also does not determine who communicates with clients or who contacts key stakeholders—regulators, custodians, insurers, vendors, or law enforcement—if circumstances require it. Technology recovery is a critical component of continuity planning. It is not the entire plan.
Your Vendors Are Part of Your Continuity Plan
Financial firms increasingly rely on third parties to perform functions that were once handled internally. That means vendor risk and business continuity risk are increasingly connected. A firm may have excellent internal procedures and still experience significant disruption because a key vendor becomes unavailable. For critical providers, firms should understand whether the provider maintains its own business continuity program, whether that program is tested, where the firm’s data is hosted, and how outages are communicated. Just as importantly, the firm needs its own answer to a simple question: what do we do while this vendor is unavailable? Can information be retrieved another way? Does a manual workaround exist? Is another provider available? How long could the business reasonably operate without the service? These questions separate critical vendors from important ones—and separate preparation from hope. Vendor due diligence therefore should not end with cybersecurity. Operational resilience matters too. But documentation from the vendor is only part of the answer. The firm still needs its own plan for what it will do if that recovery does not happen as expected.
The Plan Must Work Without the People Who Wrote It
Another common weakness in continuity planning is institutional knowledge. The people responsible for creating the plan often know exactly what the document means. Other employees may not.
A useful continuity plan should answer practical questions without requiring interpretation. Who declares an emergency? Who contacts employees and manages communication? How do employees access systems remotely? What systems must be restored first? Where are backup records located? Who has decision-making authority if senior management is unavailable? And one of the simplest questions may be among the most important: Where is the plan itself? A continuity plan stored exclusively inside a system that becomes inaccessible during the disruption is not particularly useful. Documentation becomes an operational control when procedures, emergency contact information, system instructions, escalation responsibilities, and backup processes remain accessible even when normal resources are unavailable. The more a continuity plan depends on unwritten knowledge, the less reliable it becomes during an actual disruption.
Test the Plan You Actually Have
Annual testing sometimes becomes a compliance exercise. A meeting is held. The plan is reviewed. Employees confirm that contact information is accurate. A memo documents that the test occurred. That may demonstrate that the firm reviewed its plan, but document review verifies the plan on paper; scenario testing exposes operational assumptions.
A better test introduces a realistic scenario. Imagine it is 8:15 Monday morning. Employees cannot access Microsoft 365. Email, Teams, SharePoint, and OneDrive are unavailable. The provider estimates that service may not be restored for six hours. Now the exercise becomes practical. How do employees communicate? How does management distribute instructions? Can client information still be accessed? Can trading occur? Can cash requests be processed? Can employees retrieve the firm’s continuity procedures?
Then change one assumption. What happens if the outage lasts two days instead of six hours? The scenario does not need to be elaborate. It simply needs to force the firm to operate without something it normally assumes will always be available. The objective is to discover where the plan breaks while there is still time to fix it.
A Practical Preparedness Test
National Preparedness Month is a good reason to conduct a simple review of the firm’s critical operations. Choose one important business function and begin by asking what it depends on. Identify the people, systems, vendors, information, facilities, and communication channels necessary to perform it. Then remove one of those dependencies. What happens if it is suddenly unavailable? Is there an alternative, or does the process simply stop?
Next, consider who knows what to do and whether the necessary information to execute the backup process is accessible during the type of disruption being tested. If only one employee understands the workaround, the firm may have replaced a technology dependency with a personnel dependency.
Finally, ask whether anyone has tested the workaround. A backup process that has never been used is still a theory.
Repeat that exercise across the firm’s most important functions and a clearer picture begins to emerge. The firm can see where it has clarity, where accountability is missing, and where testing should drive continuous improvement. That tells management far more about preparedness than simply rereading the BCP from beginning to end.
Preparedness Is a Management Discipline
Business continuity planning should not belong exclusively to compliance or IT. Operations understands workflows. Technology understands systems and infrastructure. Management understands business priorities. Employees understand what actually happens during the workday. Effective continuity planning requires all of those perspectives. It also requires ongoing change management. When the firm adopts a new system, changes a vendor, moves records, restructures responsibilities, adds an office, modifies remote-work arrangements, or changes how clients communicate with the firm, someone should ask: Does this change affect our continuity plan? If the answer is yes, continuity planning should be part of implementation, not something compliance discovers during the next scheduled review. The business changes, dependencies change, the plan changes, and testing confirms whether the revised process works.
Build the Guardrails Before You Need Them
Most disruptions do not announce themselves in advance. A storm does not ask whether the firm’s emergency contacts are current. A cyberattack does not wait until the next annual BCP review. Preparedness means making those decisions before the disruption occurs. For financial services firms, that means reflecting actual operations, identifying critical dependencies, assigning responsibility for response, keeping procedures accessible, and testing whether the backup plan works.
A business continuity plan should not simply describe what the firm hopes to do during an emergency. It should provide a workable path for what happens next when business as usual is no longer an option. That kind of preparedness does more than help a firm survive a disruption. It allows leadership, employees, clients, and other stakeholders to have confidence that the organization can continue functioning when conditions become difficult. And that is what well-designed guardrails are ultimately intended to support: sustainable growth and organizational confidence.





